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Defendant, Appellee and Cross Appellant, Marvin G. Neff (hereinafter "Marvin")
through counsel, Olson & Hoggan, P.C., hereby submits this Reply Brief of Cross Appellant
in support of Marvin's request for attorney fees.

INTRODUCTION
Branson has admitted that there are only three remaining issues on this appeal: (1)
whether the trial court erred in granting JNOV against Branson with respect to the jury's
specific award of attorney fees as special damages; (2) whether the trial court erred in
granting partial summary judgment on Branson's malicious prosecution claim, and (3)
whether the trial court errored or abused its discretion in finding that Marvin was not "the
prevailing party," thereby denying his request for attorney fees on the Manila Ranch case as
well as all pre-trial ABCO motions. Branson stipulated to the correction of principal and
interest, thus awarding Marvin all principal and interest sought on the Manila Ranch case.
By so doing, Branson made it clear that Marvin was the prevailing party on the Manila Ranch
case, which was a separate-bifurcated matter. The net award Marvin received from the
Manila Ranch trial was $27,865.00 in principal, plus $17,736.17 in interest, for a judgment
total of $45,601.17. Branson's defenses were denied entirely. Note, this award far exceeded
Branson's award of $8,999.00 in the ABCO trial.
Branson continues to argue inappropriately that it is Marvin's burden to marshal the
evidence regarding Branson's attempt to overturn the JNOV ruling. The trial Judge was a
fact finder and listened to this case for over six years. There was no reason to marshal the
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evidence for the trial Judge. He heard all of the facts. However, when Branson challenged
the Judge's JNOV decision on appeal, the Appellate Court does not have the benefit of all of
those facts and it is Branson's duty, as Appellant, to marshal. The simple solution on this
appeal lies in paragraph 6.C. and 8.C. of the Special Jury Instructions which state:
"If the jury awarded Branson damages under paragraph (A), does the jury find
that Marvin should be held to pay Branson's attorney fees?" (Emphasis added).
Because the jury awarded Branson zero damages under paragraph A, the "if" language
in paragraph C made it clear that the jury should not have even answered the rest of that
sentence. Judge Low appropriately so held and Branson's bad faith attempt to use the jury
foreman affidavit to delve into the mind, thoughts, and mental processes of the jury are
totally inappropriate.
Branson failed to rebut the summary judgment decision on malicious prosecution
because he could not establish the necessary prima facie elements with sufficient evidence to
support a malicious prosecution action. The trial court found that Marvin had shown
probable cause, that Branson was in deed guilty of violating the protective order and was not
innocent on the altercation since he knowingly drove recklessly down the highway while
Marvin was pleading for his life, and that Marvin was justified in enforcing the protective
order. Branson would like us believe his bald assertion that Marvin lied about the whole
event, but Branson can only point to a hearsay affidavit of a neighbor that shows nothing of
the sort. The malicious prosecution summary judgment was proper.
This reply brief is submitted to demonstrate that Marvin is entitled to attorney fees for
successfully defending and upholding the contract as binding as well as clearly prevailing on
-2-

the bifurcated Manila Ranch trial for three reasons:
1.

The evidence is overwhelming that Marvin prevailed on the pre-trial motions to

uphold the contract as well as being awarded $45,000.00 in the Manila Ranch trial. The
majority of Branson's case was dismissed in pre-trial motions. The contract was upheld as
binding and enforceable. After four years of litigation, Branson could not show any evidence
of fraud to avoid the contract.
The Manila Ranch trial was separate and bifurcated because Branson asked that it not
be part of the ABCO trial. The ABCO litigation was conducted in two phases: (1) the pretrial dispositive motion phase and (2) the jury trial phase. Judge Low's decision dated June
19, 2007 and November 6, 2007 clearly bar both parties from attorney fees for the breach of
contract issues in the ABCO trial, but attorney fees on the Manila Ranch case and ABCO
pre-trial motions were reserved and Marvin never even asked for those fees until November
20, 2007.
2.

Where Marvin so clearly prevailed on separate pre-trial issues and Manila

Ranch, it is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Marvin's attorney fees as a matter of
law, unless three extraordinary instances appear in the findings, which instances are:
a.

The prevailing party received equitable value in a forfeiture case that

supplants attorney fees.
b.

The prevailing party was offered a generous settlement, refused the

settlement and proceeded to trial and then received a jury award similar to the
settlement offer, or
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c.

The prevailing party was part of the cause of the default under the

contract and acted improperly.
As will be shown below, Marvin does not fit into any of these extraordinary instances
and should have received his attorney fees.
3.

The proper review of the July 25. 2008 final decision by Judge Low shows that

the Judge made conclusions and orders by generalizing the evidence without actually listing
specific facts applicable in the findings to support the conclusions. Without adequate
findings, it is impossible to decide if Judge Low's conclusions were properly made. Thus,
the case must be remanded.
Lastly, it is inappropriate for Branson to use a juror affidavit which discusses the
mental deliberations and emotions of the jury. There is nothing in the affidavit that talks
about the fact that the jury was confused or made a mistake. The affidavit was never entered
or used as evidence, was specifically forbidden by Judge Low and inappropriately filed by
Branson without notice to opposing counsel. There were no damage calculations made in the
special jury verdict that were in error. That is the only time a jury affidavit can be used to
show mistake. The fact that the jury may have been confused by instructions which Branson
approved, if they were confused, is not grounds to assert an affidavit for evidence. Branson
should be sanctioned for improper use of the affidavit.

REPLY FACTS WHICH BRANSON HAS TRIED TO CONFUSE
1.

Branson first tries to confuse facts by arguing that Marvin sought damages of

approximately $1,500,000.00 in his initial cross complaint, but ignores the fact that soon
-4-

thereafter, during the proceedings, Marvin never sought damages. In the Paul Felt mediation,
Marvin never sought any damages and actually was willing to give Branson the retirement
account known as the ^Salary Continuation Fund" worth $250,000.00, plus give to Branson
all of the Manila Ranch property, which totaled over $95,000.00 in cash ($45,000.00
awarded to Marvin, plus $50,000.00 of Marvin's still in Manila escrow), plus 26 acres just to
settle the entire matter. Branson refused the offer and marched forth to trial, seeking over $ 1
million in general damages, plus five (5) times that sum in punitive damages. Branson
claims he is confused regarding how Marvin arrived at Branson's requested damages of
$5,304,070.00. When you divide $5,304,070.00 by six (5 times for punitives plus one for
actual damages) which was Branson's own formula for punitives, it explains the number
arrived at.
2.

Branson belittles Marvin's claim in the ABCO jury trial of only $1.00.

Branson claims he had done such a masterful job convincing the jury of Marvin's poor
defense that Marvin decided to raise a white flag and ask for only $ 1.00. The truth, as Judge
Low acknowledges, was Marvin could have sought more damages, but Marvin choose to
merely defend against Branson's claims and get his life and family back. R. 11356, 11483,
Transcript on April 16, 2007, page 6. Moreover, Branson never compares Marvin's
$45,000.00 Manila judgment to Branson's $9,001.00 jury verdict for obvious reasons.
3.

Marvin eventually won everything he asked for in the separate Manila Ranch

trial. He was awarded $45,000.00 plus the $50,000 held in escrow. Branson leaves this out
entirely. Marvin also successfully blocked Branson's jury claim to obtain $250,000.00 from
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the Salary Continuation Plan. Branson was only awarded $9,000.00 on his breach of contract
claim in the ABCO trial, which Judge Low found nominal or de minimus and said he would
have awarded nothing. R. 11483, page 5.
4.

Branson inappropriately confuses the issue of how much the brothers sought at

the ABCO trial. During mediation and afterwards, Marvin made it clear he was defending
against Branson. Marvin only asked for $1.00 on his trial claims because he was purely
defending against his brother's attack. Branson, on the other hand, asked not only for
principal and interest exceeding $879,000.00 (R. 8585-8587), but also for five times that
award in punitive damages, plus attorney fees of $377,000.00. The jury only awarded
Branson $9,001.00 for all of Branson's claims, which truly is de minimus. Branson claims
Marvin's $2.00 jury award is really small, instead of acknowledging it was 100% of what
Marvin sought as stated by Judge Low. R. 11483, Transcript April 16, page 6.
5.

Branson also ignored the fact that it took nearly five (5) years of litigation plus

a trial on August 29, 2007 to obtain the $45,000.00 from Manila Ranch that Marvin was
entitled to receive. Judge Low denied all of Branson's requested Manila offsets in the July
25, 2008 decision.
6.

Branson confuses the November 6, 2007 reconsideration decision, which must

be read in conjunction with the June 19, 2007 decision, which Judge Low was reconsidering.
These two decisions only covered Branson's request for attorney fees. Marvin never even
filed an affidavit for cost and attorney fees until November 20, 2007, and then only on pretrial motions and Manila Ranch. The trial court viewed neither party as a prevailing party
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with regard only to the trial phase of the ABCO case. Trial judge limited his decision on
attorney fees to the contract breach claims made during trial. The trial court obviously
reserved Marvin's attorney fee request on who was the prevailing party on pre-trial motions
in the ABCO matters (R. 11190) as well as the Manila Ranch case. R. 11484, pages 140-143.
7.

The Neff Family Trust, dated August 19, 1984, as Exhibit 1 in the Manila

Ranch trial, paragraph 9.10, indicates that a Trustee can appoint, employ and pay such agents
and employees as the Trustee deems necessary, including attorneys. Normally those fees are
paid from the trust estate. Marvin was a Co-Trustee and his fees should have come from
Branson's share of the Trust estate. In addition, the Manila Ranch sale to the Pallesens also
included a provision in the Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed for attorney fees should any
party have to initiate enforcement of those documents. The sales contract required the
installments to be split 50/50. Branson didn't divide the Trust Deed Note installments with
Marvin as he should have and made other misappropriations. (See also Agreement, Manila
Ranch Exhibit 7). Marvin should be entitled to his attorney fees under the reciprocal
provisions of Utah law. Additionally, Section 75-7-1004(1) indicates that the court can award
reasonable attorney fees to any party who prevails againsl a trustee. Branson has cited no
facts in the July 25, 2008 decision that the court ever ruled on the Manila Ranch attorney fees
because there are none.

-7-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
MARVIN WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY ON BOTH THE ABCO
PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS AS WELL AS THE MANILA RANCH
BIFURCATED TRIAL
Branson has not and cannot dispute that Marvin prevailed on all pre-trial motions to
enforce the contract and uphold its validity against Branson's claims that it was void or
voidable, or that he could rescind it for fraud, mistake, deceit, failure to disclose, agreement
to agree, condition precedent, or any other legal theory. The trial court ultimately held on
January 9, 2007, after four years of litigation, that the Buyout Contract in the ABCO case
was fully enforceable. There is no question under the law, as provided in Chase v. Scott,
2001 UT App. 404, 38 P.3d 1001 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). that a party who successfully
defends against an opponent's suit to rescind the contract is entitled to an award of attorney
fees and costs incurred in said defense.
Nor is there any question that Marvin won everything he asked for in the separatebifurcated Manila Ranch trial. This was readily confirmed by the parties' recent stipulation,
after Marvin filed his brief on appeal to correct the clerical error and seek proper interest.
Branson stipulated to correct the clerical error and to pay the proper interest. Marvin was
awarded $27,865.00 in principal and $17,736.17 in interest for a total of $45,607.17.
Branson's defenses of statute of limitations and set off in the Manila Ranch case were
defeated. If you were to compare Branson's limited success on his $9,000.00 contract breach
claim to Marvin's $45,601.17 success in the Manila Ranch claim, there is no question that
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Marvin received a greater award and was thus the prevailing party. Marvin was the
prevailing or successful party on the pre-trial motions on ABCO/Aspen Springs and the
bifurcated Manila Ranch trial, using either the net judgment rule or the flexible and reasoned
approach.
Branson attempts to argue that Judge Low made an all encompassing decision that
neither party prevailed when you analyze the whole case together, which theory ignores what
Judge Low actually ruled; i.e. that neither party prevailed on the contract breach claims in
the ABCO trial. For instance, the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law entered June 19,
2007 regarding Branson's request for attorney fees on the ABCO trial specifically held that
Branson was not the prevailing party on the issues of contract and that Branson's attorney
fees were unreasonable. R. 10566. The Court later clarified this Order in the reconsideration
decision on November 6, 2007 as follows:
".. .the Court finds that neither party is justified in receiving attorney's fees in
regards to the breach of contract issue. The Court finds that even if the parties
were justified in receiving attorney's fees, the fees would offset one another.
Therefore, Attorney's fees in regards to the breach of contract issue will
not be awarded to either party." (Emphasis added). R. 11190-11191.
Note, it was after this date that Marvin requested attorney fees on November 20,2007
on all pre-trial ABCO motions to "enforce the contract" for which he was successful. The
Manila Ranch case was still being scrutinized for Branson's offset claims, and Marvin's
attorney fees thereon were specifically reserved until the offsets were determined. The trial
court eventually ruled on July 25, 2008 that Branson was not entitled to any offsets.
Arguably, by the time Judge Low made a final decision of July 25,2008, he lost focus
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on Marvin's separate claims for attorney fees. In fact, it appeared in the record (R. 1135211353) that Judge Low reverted to the breach of contract claims in the ABCO trial while
ignoring entirely Marvin's reserved request for attorney fees on Manila Ranch. Although
Judge Low briefly stated: "The Defendant has also sought his Pre-trial attorney fees and costs
as they relate to the Aspen Spring/ABCO portion of this bifurcated action." (R. 11353). He
seemed to forget the enormity of four years of pre-trial motions and focused instead on
Marvin and Branson's contract breach claims and associated attorney fees. For instance.
Judge Low states:
"(Defendants) Claims, except breach of contract by the Plaintiff were
voluntarily withdrawn by the Defendant before the matter was submitted to the
jury. On the Defendant's breach of contract he requested and was awarded
one dollar ($1.00).
Both parties cite the contractual language in case law in support of their
claims. The Defendant also graphically sets forth the Plaintiffs claims and the
Plaintiffs failure to receive any awards thereon." R. 11352.
In fact, the only claim Branson was successful on was the breach of contract claim for
$9,000.00. The trial court found that Branson's recovery would "generously be described as
nominal and more accurately de minimus in its nature and amount." R. 11352.
A possible explanation for the above confusion lies with Judge Low retiring on
August 31, 2007. He never really looked at the case thereafter until the summer of 2008, and
again focused primarily on his experience in the ABCO trial on the breach of contract and
other trial claims. He found that neither party would be awarded attorney fees on those
claims since neither could be determined as the prevailing party on breach of contract.
Careful review of the July 25, 2008 decision shows that Judge Low failed entirely to
-10-

even mention attorney fees regarding the Manila Ranch claim. See R. 11353. The only clear
conclusion from these three decisions by the trial court was that neither party prevailed on the
breach of contract or other trial claims in the ABCO trial, but Marvin's Manila Ranch
success was entirely overlooked and Marvin's pre-trial motion success in the ABCO case
was given little or no consideration. Marvin is entitled to proper findings of fact and a
separate ruling on Manila Ranch for attorney fees. Unquestionably, Marvin prevailed, was
awarded $45,000.00, while Branson's defenses were all denied. The Manila trust document,
trust deed note, trust deed and the trust statute all suggest the prevailing party is entitled to
attorney fees.
Additionally, the ABCO/Aspen Springs case was litigated in two phases: (1) the pretrial dispositive motions and (2) the remaining issues at jury trial. The pre-trial dispositive
motions were decided in Marvin's favor and took up the bulk of the case for over four (4)
years. Marvin should have been awarded his attorney fees for successfully upholding and
enforcing the contract as a binding document. To hold otherwise encourages or allows bad
faith litigants to file frivolous claims to overturn a binding contract based on unsupportable
allegations of fraud with no consequences. Branson tied up Marvin's resources and the
Court's time for four years with no consequence. As Judge Low aptly stated in paragraph 14
of the Findings of Fact entered June 19, 2007:
wC

Plaintiff incurred his attorneys fees primarily on causes of action which were
either dismissed or for which attorney fees are not recoverable. For instance,
Plaintiffs claim to set aside the subject contract on grounds of fraud consumed
substantially all of the pre-litigation motions and was totally unmeritorious.
After four years of litigation, Plaintiff could not substantiate the fraud claim
with any evidence/'
-11 -

Branson should be required to pay Marvin's attorney fees to defend against four (4)
years of frivolous or unmeritorious pre-trial litigation and the separate trial where Marvin
prevailed on $45,000.00 in the Manila Ranch case, which took nearly six years to resolve.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
IGNORED MARVIN'S PREVAILING STATUS AND AWARDED
MARVIN NO ATTORNEY FEES.

Utah follows the American rule regarding awards of attorney fees, Cobabe v.
Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 835 (Utah Ct. App. 1989):
'This general rule requires each party to bear his or her own attorney fees in
the absence of a statute or enforceable contractual provision to the contrary ...
If a contract provides for an award of attorney fees, cthe court may award
attorney fees in accordance with the terms of the parties' agreement. Trayner
v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984)." (Id. at 835).
"'Provisions in written contracts providing for payment of attorney fees should
ordinarily be honored by the Court.'"
Cobabe, at 836 (quoting Stacey Properties vs Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah Ct. App.
1988)).
"Furthermore, contrary to...[the] contention that attorney fees should be
determined on the basis of an equitable standard, attorneys fees, when awarded
as allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of legal right."
Cabrera v Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added).
Uw

Since the right is contractual, the court does not possess the same equitable
discretion to deny attorney's fees that it has when fashioning equitable
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remedies, or applying a statute which allows the discretionary award of such
fees."
Cobabe at 836.
Thus, when a party, such as Marvin, has prevailed on a contract action,
attorney fees should be awarded as a matter of legal righl.
1.

Branson has tried to say he should be awarded fees and Marvin should

not.
There are three extraordinary situations where courts, in their discretion, have declined
to award attorney fees to a prevailing party in spite of an enforceable contractual or statutory
provision. For instance, in Cobabe at 836 the Court cited denial of attorney fees to a
prevailing party was not an abuse of discretion if it was based on forfeiture, or settlement
offers prior to trial that were very close to the actual trial award, or where the prevailing party
showed improper conduct.
The first type of case, forfeiture, must generally involve a prevailing party who
received a sizeable equity award back because of the forfeiture. See Fullmer v. Blood, 546
P.2d 606, 610 (Utah 1976) (where Plaintiff/Seller had already received $12,150.00 from the
purchaser, which was forfeited and not recoverable to the Defendant/Purchaser. The Court
reasoned that a suit of this nature, involving the invocation of a forfeiture, involves equitable
principles which should be addressed to the conscience and discretion of the trial court).
Note, however, Neffv. Nejf does not involve a forfeiture of real estate and neither brother
received any equitable right over the other as a result.
The second instance is when the prevailing party refused generous offers of settlement
-13-

prior to the trial then forged ahead to trial and received an equal or slightly higher award.
See Cable Marine, Inc. v. M/V Trust Me II, 632 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. Fla. 1980) (where the
Court found that because Plaintiff filed suit to recover cost of repairs and the Defendant
offered reasonable solutions to correct those repairs, including two solutions that were only
slightly less than the total cost of repairs, the Court affimied the trial court's denial of
Plaintiffs attorney fees since Plaintiff had acted unreasonably in not accepting either of the
earlier settlement offers made by Defendant and forced the cause to trial). The Court went on
to posit:
"Although plaintiff may have been compelled to initiate a lawsuit to recover
the repair costs, the district court could well have concluded that plaintiff acted
unreasonably in incurring needless expense by pursuing the suit beyond the
offers of payment.'* Id. at 1345.
Similarly, in this case, Branson refused reasonable offers to settle and incurred
unreasonable expense by forging ahead, eventually receiving much less, but actually paying
Marvin nearly $36,000.00, net. Marvin was forced to refuse Branson's un-reasonable offers
of over $800,000.00 on ABCO and zero on Manila Ranch. Marvin even reduced the cost to
pursue the Manila Ranch case by proffering evidence and stipulating on the first day of trial
to the award. Branson, by comparison, in the ABCO case, refused Marvin's generous offer
to give Branson the Salary Continuation retirement benefits of $250,000.00 plus over
$95,000.00 on the Manila Ranch properties. Instead, Branson plowed ahead to a three week
jury trial, was awarded nothing on the Salary Continuation, was only awarded $9,000.00 on
the breach of contract, and was awarded zero offsets on the Manila Ranch case. It is obvious
that the Trial court could have denied all of Branson's attorney fees for his unreasonable
- 14-

expense after the pre-trial settlement offers. However, it would be totally unreasonable for
the Court to apply that same theory to Marvin since Marvin actually won far beyond what he
offered, and Branson lost over $800,000.00 based on his offer.
The third case cited by Cobabe in which a Court can deny the prevailing attorney fees
is if the prevailing party acted improperly or in bad faith. See United States use of A. V. De
Blasio Constr. CO., Inc. v. Mountain States Constr. Co., 588 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. Wash. 1978)
and Annotation, When may federal court declined to award the prevailing party attorney fees
authorized by contract, 56 A.L.R. Fed. 871. In Mountain States Constr. Co., the Court
reasoned that because Plaintiff Deblasio was partly at fault for his own termination under a
contract, which Deblasio asked the Court to enforce, for attorney fees, that the Court had
discretion to conclude that allowing attorney fees to Deblasio, when he had acted improperly,
would be inequitable and unreasonable. 588 F. 2d at 263. Again, there is plenty of evidence
that Branson acted improperly in pursuing Marvin, and that perhaps both brothers were at
fault for the ABCO trial breach claims, but there are no specific findings were ever made that
Marvin acted improperly in pursuing Branson on Manila Ranch or defending the pre-trial
motions to avoid the contract. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered June
19, 2007 at R. 10563 through 10567, clearly found Branson had been improper:
Finding 11:
"Plaintiff failed to allocate the attorneys fees to specific causes of action or to
causes of action for which recovery of attorneys fees might be allowed."
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Paragraph 12:
"Prior to trial, most of Plaintiff s claims were dismissed
Paragraph 13:
"At trial, Plaintiff sought monetary damages in excess of one million dollars ..

Paragraph 14:
"Plaintiff incurred attorneys fees primarily on causes of action which were
either dismissed or for which attorneys fees are not recoverable. For instance,
Plaintiffs claim to set aside the subject contract on grounds of fraud consumed
substantially all of the pre-litigation motions and was totally unmeritorious.
After four years of litigation. Plaintiff could not substantiate the fraud claim
with any evidence
"
Paragraph 16:
"...The Court finds that the jury verdict supports the Court's finding that
substantially all of Plaintiff s claims were unmeritorious."
Paragraph 17:
".. .The Court finds that Plaintiff unnecessarily and unmeritoriously required
Defendants to participate in the litigation, to assert defenses, and to defend
against Plaintiffs claims at trial."
Judge Low also ruled:
"If I find fault in this case, frankly it's the bringing of this action [by Branson]
in the first place and prosecuting it." R. 11483 page 7.
In motion practice and at trial by jury, the Plaintiff failed to recover or succeed
on the majority of his claims [17 total claims]. On a single claim described as
a breach of contract, the Plaintiff did receive a judgment...the recovery can
only generously be described as nominal or more accurately de minimus in its
nature and amount." R. 11352.
"The Defendant is even criticized [by Plaintiff] for dismissing the [ABCO]
claims made. In this Court's view, both parties should have done so before
any action was even filed." R. 11356.
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The above finings were all reasons why Branson should not be awarded his fees, but
note the trial judge did not specifically find Marvin had acted improperly except in regards to
the ABCO trial on breach of contract. R. 11483, page 5. In fact, Judge Low found
specifically that Marvin was required to unnecessarily defend against Branson's legal attack
on his pre-trial motions (paragraph 17 of June 19, 2009 Order). Marvin was not to blame for
defending himself or retrieving money Manila Ranch Branson misappropriated out of the
Trust. The court did scold both parties for the excessive number of motions and pleadings
and expressed the opinion each should have avoided the lawsuit in the first place. However,
Judge Low never asked for evidence on how Marvin tried to resolve the case with Branson.
When Judge Low asked Marvin about his sisters, Judge Low found Marvin more than
generous, willing to give up over $75,000.00. R. 11484, pages 114 - 116. Thus, because
Marvin prevailed and did not fit in the three categories above, it was an abuse of discretion to
deny his attorney fees.
2.

The Court abused its discretion in failing to review how Marvin tried to

settle this case with Branson, that Branson continued to request exorbitant settlement
fees, that Marvin was merely defending himself against Branson throughout the case.
Attorney fees incurred by Marvin to successfully defend against Branson's
unmeritorious claims to set aside the contract and his unreasonable demands, settlement
offers and litigation are the heart of this case. Marvin never wanted this lawsuit; he did try to
settle it. He even dismissed all his ABCO/Aspen Springs claims to $1.00, but he wanted his
attorney fees if he was ultimately successful. Marvin attempted to resolve this with Branson
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when Branson hired attorney Ben Hathaway, before the lawsuit ever began. Marvin signed
corrective deeds before the suit began. Marvin mediated with Paul Felt soon after the
lawsuit. Marvin released Travis Bowen and tried to narrow the issues, by filing summary
judgment motions.
The fact that Judge Low gave up and basically washed his hands of the file after
judicial retirement should be considered an abuse of discretion. Clearly, Judge Low was as
tired of Branson's continued litigation as was Marvin. To then ignore Marvin's reasonable
and separate request for attorney fees just because Branson was so difficult, was improper.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT, IN ANY EVENT, FAILED TO MAKE
ADEQUATE FINDINGS AND THE FEW FINDINGS MADE DO NOT
SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED.

Branson has failed to address whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
issued by Judge Low are sufficient and adequate given the Manila Ranch trial and the pretrial motions in the ABCO case. Branson merely claims that Marvin failed to carry his
marshaling burden. However, Branson failed to realize that the marshaling burden is
lessened or relieved when the judge fails to make detailed findings of fact or said finings are
so inadequate or nonspecific that the reviewing court cannot determine how the conclusion
was reached. See generally Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day St.s, 2007 UT 42, P18-P21. Under the title ^Clarification of the Marshaling
Requirement" the Utah Supreme Court stated:
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"[W]e have used language implying that appellate courts are strictly bound to
affirm the accuracy of the ...trial court's factual findings in the absence of
marshaling...Despite this language, the marshaling requirement is not a
limitation on the power of the appellate courts...It is not itself, a rule of
substantive law...The reviewing court...retains discretion to consider
independently the whole record and determine if the decision below has
adequate factual support."
Next Branson argues that the trial court properly rejected Marvin's request for
separate attorney fee determinations on the Manila Ranch trial, which was bifurcated from
the ABCO hearings, as well as the pre-trial ABCO motions, using the global lawsuit
approach. Marvin's attorney fee claims were specifically reserved in orders and on the record
as separately determinable. There is no dispute that the court never considered the Manila
Ranch attorney fees even though Marvin had prevailed completely on Manila Ranch.
Judge Low also advanced little or no effort to examine the success of Marvin on pretrial motions in the July 25, 2008 decision. Judge Low merely said he was denying the pretrial motion attorney fees for the same reason as the trial attorney fees, which trial was vastly
different than the pre-trial matters.
Branson next claims that Marvin waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the July
25, 2008 trial decision because Marvin did not object to the district court's lack of findings.
Marvin could not object because the court never issued a final ruling until July 25, 2008 and
in that ruling the court specifically stated, "the Court will address the heart of the matter
without further motions, memoranda or other supporting documents or oral argument." (See
page 3 of Decision) and, "[t]his will constitute the final order herein and any further relief is
to be sought on appeal." (See page 9 of Decision). Thus, Marvin could not waive any
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argument about the court's findings since the court refused to hear any further argument,
rejected any attempt by either party to make further arguments and required the parties to go
directly to the Appellate Court.
Branson next argues that the trial court made appropriate or adequate findings under
the flexible and reasoned approach. First of all, even though the court admitted that there was
contractual language for awarding attorney fees under a prevailing party approach, the court
never examined the Manila Ranch contracts or statute for attorney fees, nor did Judge Low
examine the ABCO contracted language to "enforce" the contract on pre-trial issues.
The number of claims, counterclaims and cross claims that the parties had brought for
which they were successful was actually balanced clearly in Marvin's favor. In fact, the
court specifically said that of all of Branson's claims (over 17) he was denied recovery on 16
of said claims by either outright dismissal or no damages. Branson was only successful on
one claim and that was his breach of contract claim and the court considered that de minimus.
The rest were considered unmeritorious. Marvin's claims, on the other hand were withdrawn
or reduced to $ 1.00. The court never weighed Marvin's success on all of the pre-trial motions
in the final order of July 25, 2008. Judge Low earlier said the majority of Marvin's defense,
covering four years of litigation, against Branson's fraud and rescission claims were
necessary and that Branson's claims were totally unmeritorious. The court made no mention
of Marvin's success of over $45,000.00 on the Manila Ranch bifurcated trial. The court only
looked at Marvin's $1.00 recovery in the ABCO trial.
Branson next tries to claim that the court considered the relative importance of the
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parties claims. However, there are absolutely no findings comparing the importance of the
Manila Ranch $45,000.00 award with the $9,000.00 jury award to Branson. Nor are there
any specific findings in the July 25, 2008 decision regarding how monumental Marvin's
success was on pre-trial motions even though the court indicated in earlier decisions that that
involved the majority of the case and that Branson's claims were totally unmeritorious.
Next Branson tries to claim that the trial court did consider the amounts awarded by
the jury. The trial court only considered the amounts awarded in the ABCO jury trial for
purposes of breach of contract, R. 11349 and 11353 (comparing $9,000.00 to $1.00, but only
on the breach of contract claim). The court, however, never considered Marvin's success on
the Manila Ranch claim in that equation.
The truth is, the court's Memorandum Decision was not styled as Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law, but as a final order. There were no specific fact findings made, only
general conclusory statements. The conclusions cannot stand unless they are supported by
specific and adequate factual findings. The lack of adequate findings of fact and
insufficiencies of evidence leave this court without the ability to make a meaningful review.
Thus, the case should be remanded for findings in line with Marvin's success.

RESPONSE TO JUROR AFFIDAVIT
Lastly, Branson attempts to argue that the jury foreman's affidavit is admissible
evidence on appeal, to show a mistake. This is completely incorrect for the following
reasons:
1.

The trial court refused to allow Branson to use the jury affidavit on April 16,
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2007.
2.

Branson then filed the jury affidavit surreptitiously on April 30,2007 after oral

argument, without including a mailing certificate to opposing counsel.
3.

Branson then attempted to place the jury affidavit in the docketing statement as

if it was evidence already considered or used by the trial court. Marvin was never allowed to
even cross-examine the foreman or supply rebuttal evidence.
4.

Both Utah common law and Federal common law as well as the statute under

Utah Rules of Evidence 606(b) make it overwhelmingly clear that juror affidavits cannot be
used to delve into the thought processes, speculations or deliberations of the jury, which, this
foreman's affidavit grossly does. In fact, nothing in the foreman's affidavit talks about a
mistake on the jury verdict form. Branson's attempt to say that the jury over looked the clear
language of question 6C and 8C as a mistake is totally unavailing. The type of mistake
where a jury affidavit may help occurs in instances where the jury thought they were
awarding $100,000.00 and mistakenly wrote $10,000.00 instead. Although an affidavit for
such a mistake may be appropriate, the affidavit in this situation discusses no such mistake
and is merely Branson's attempt to taint the verdict. Utah's Rule 606(b) specifically forbids
the jury from expressing anything about their deliberations or emotions as influencing the
juror or their mental processes in connection therewith. This particular juror affidavit is full
of the jury's emotions, mind set, and influences thereon in connection with the award.
Marvin already made it clear in his response in support of motion to strike the juror
affidavit that there was no error in the calculation of the amount of verdict, i.e. $9,000.00 or
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zero. Only the Judge was to calculate attorney fees. Judge Low ruled that Branson was not
entitled to any attorney fees in any event. Additionally Branson did not object to the language
of the special verdict and cannot now complain that said language confused the jury. The
jury clearly wrote zero damages in paragraph 6A and 8A and paragraph 6C and 8C clearly
states, "If the jury awarded Branson damages under paragraph (A), does the jury find
that Marvin should be held to pay Branson's attorney fees?" (Emphasis added.) There is no
confusion in that language. Since the jury did not award Branson any damages under
paragraph A where they wrote zero, they should not have checked the attorney fee box.
Judge Low correctly ruled.
Instead, this case closely resembles the case of Beldon v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317,
1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (where the jury was confused about comparative negligence,
found the motorcycle driver 70% negligent, but then awarded the motorcycle driver
$69,083.00 in damages.) The court in Beldon non-suited the action since the motorcycle
driver was more than 50% negligent which is very similar to a directed verdict or judgment
not withstanding the verdict. The injured motorcycle driver asked for new trial and filed four
juror affidavits attaching the same to his brief for the first time, each claiming juror
confusion on the instructions. The Appellate Court rejected those affidavits as not properly
before the court and specifically cautioned counsel that improper submission of jury
affidavits is viewed with extreme disfavor by the Appellate Court. Branson's improper
attempt to taint this appeal with inadmissible evidence should be sanctioned with appropriate
attorney fees to Marvin.
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CONCLUSION
Marvin is entitled to an award of attorney fees under the prevailing party theory using
the reasonable and flexible approach, the net judgment rule or any other equitable rule
Marvin successfully defended the contract against Branson's major attack during pre-trial
motions to set it aside or avoid it. Marvin clearly prevailed on the separate Manila Ranch
trial. The only logical conclusion regarding the trial court's final decision is the court focused
only on the breach of contract claims, slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims of
both parties at trial and found neither successful there, and washed those fees. However, the
evidence regarding the pre-trial ABCO case and the Manila Ranch matters overwhelmingly
justifies remanding this case for findings that support Marvin's request for attorney fees.
Marvin asks for all attorney fees to prevail on this appeal.
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